CNSA 2.0, EO 14028, and OMB M-22-09 converge on a single requirement: every cached credential, authorization decision, and computation result must be PQ-signed, auditable, and independently verifiable. Current cache infrastructure satisfies none of these.
Federal systems face three simultaneous shifts. CNSA 2.0 mandates PQ migration by 2030 for National Security Systems. Executive Order 14028 requires software supply chain integrity and SBOM. OMB M-23-16 requires zero-trust architecture across all federal agencies. Cache infrastructure sits at the intersection of all three — every cached credential, authorization decision, and computation result must be PQ-signed, auditable, and independently verifiable.
Current cache infrastructure — Redis, ElastiCache in GovCloud — satisfies none of these requirements. And FedRAMP authorization adds 6+ months for every separate infrastructure component.
ElastiCache is a separate boundary component with its own security controls, monitoring, and incident response documentation. Every separate network service in your authorization boundary adds controls to document, controls to test, and controls to continuously monitor. Cache should be invisible infrastructure — not a 6-month ATO line item.
CNSA 2.0 replaces 64-byte Ed25519 signatures with 3,309-byte ML-DSA-65 signatures. Cached session tokens, certificates, and signed authorization decisions grow 50x. Redis latency scales linearly with payload — at PQ key sizes, every cached credential read becomes a bottleneck. Federal systems handling millions of authorization decisions per day cannot absorb this latency increase.
Current federal cache infrastructure stores CUI (Controlled Unclassified Information) in plaintext memory. No per-key access controls — Redis AUTH is all-or-nothing. No audit trail of individual key access — NIST SP 800-171 control 3.3.1 requires audit records. No integrity verification — SP 800-171 control 3.14.1 requires system integrity monitoring. No FIPS-validated cryptography at the cache layer — FIPS 140-3 required for FedRAMP Moderate and High.
No provenance tracking — SP 800-172 enhanced control 3.13.4e requires provenance for high-value assets. Defense contractors handling CUI under CMMC Level 2 and Level 3 have identical gaps. 14 NIST SP 800-171 controls directly touch cache infrastructure.
FedRAMP Moderate requires FIPS 140-3 validated cryptography for data at rest and in transit. ElastiCache offers EBS encryption (disk-level), but memory is plaintext. The "encryption at rest" marketing claim does not protect in-memory data. And neither Redis nor ElastiCache can answer the question every assessor asks: "Can you prove this cached value has not been modified since it was stored?"
Cachee changes the compliance model. Instead of bolting compliance onto cache infrastructure, the architecture itself satisfies federal requirements.
In-process architecture eliminates cache as a separate FedRAMP boundary component. No separate security controls, monitoring, or incident response documentation. Reduces authorization boundary. Accelerates ATO timeline. Cache becomes invisible infrastructure.
FIPS 204 (ML-DSA-65) and FIPS 205 (SLH-DSA) provide FIPS-validated post-quantum cryptography at the cache layer. Three independent PQ families provide cryptographic agility — if one algorithm shows weakness, two remain valid. Zero-downtime algorithm swap at key rotation. CNSA 2.0 compliance today, not 2030.
Hash-chained audit log satisfies SP 800-171 control 3.3.1 (audit records) and 3.3.2 (audit review). Computation fingerprint satisfies SP 800-172 control 3.13.4e (provenance tracking). Every state change recorded. Every chain integrity verifiable. Tamper-evident by construction.
Owner/Regulator/Auditor key types map directly to federal role-based access control requirements. Every cached value independently verifiable — satisfies zero-trust principle: never trust, always verify. Continuous monitoring via CacheeMetrics maps to FedRAMP ConMon requirements.
Compliance is no longer a documentation exercise. It's a mathematical property of the cache layer.
Run it yourself: brew install cachee && cachee-gold-demo
In-process cache means a smaller authorization boundary. Fewer boundary components means fewer controls to document, fewer controls to test, and fewer controls to continuously monitor. Cache becomes invisible infrastructure — not a separate ATO line item with 6+ months of additional authorization work.
All 14 SP 800-171 cache-relevant controls satisfied by architecture, not by add-on tooling. Defense contractors handling CUI get cache-level compliance out of the box. No separate compliance project for cache infrastructure.
Three independent PQ families provide algorithm transition readiness for CNSA 2.0 compliance. If NIST deprecates one algorithm, two remain valid. Zero-downtime algorithm swap at key rotation. Long-term attestation durability protects against harvest-now-decrypt-later for decades.
Zero-trust cache: every read verified, every access logged, every value independently provable. Hash-chained audit trail provides tamper-evident records for Inspector General investigations. One command reconstructs any cached value's full lifecycle at any point in time.
| Framework | Requirement | Cachee Implementation |
|---|---|---|
| FedRAMP Low | Boundary controls, access logging | In-process = no separate boundary; hash-chained audit log |
| FedRAMP Moderate | FIPS 140-3, integrity monitoring | FIPS 204/205 signatures; CacheeMetrics ConMon |
| FedRAMP High | Enhanced integrity, provenance | 3 PQ signatures + computation fingerprint + audit chain |
| CMMC Level 2 | SP 800-171 (110 controls) | 14 cache-relevant controls satisfied by architecture |
| CMMC Level 3 | SP 800-172 enhanced controls | Provenance (3.13.4e), enhanced integrity (3.14), enhanced audit |
| SP 800-171 3.3.1 | Create audit records | Hash-chained audit log per cached entry |
| SP 800-171 3.3.2 | Audit review, analysis, reporting | AUDITLOG + AUDITVERIFY commands |
| SP 800-171 3.13.1 | Monitor, control communications | In-process (zero network exposure for reads) |
| SP 800-171 3.13.8 | Cryptographic mechanisms for CUI | FIPS 204 (ML-DSA-65) + FIPS 205 (SLH-DSA) |
| SP 800-171 3.14.1 | System integrity monitoring | 3 PQ signatures per entry, modification detectable |
| SP 800-171 3.14.6 | Monitor for unauthorized changes | CacheeMetrics continuous monitoring |
| SP 800-172 3.13.4e | Provenance tracking | Computation fingerprint (SHA3-256 input binding) |
| SP 800-172 3.14.1e | Enhanced integrity verification | 3 independent PQ families (2-of-3 degradation) |
| SP 800-172 3.3.1e | Enhanced audit logging | Tamper-evident hash chain + Merkle anchoring |
| CNSA 2.0 | PQ migration by 2030 (NSS) | PQ-native today; 3-family cryptographic agility |
| EO 14028 | Supply chain integrity, SBOM | Computation fingerprint = verifiable supply chain attestation |
| Zero Trust (OMB M-22-09) | Never trust, always verify | Every read verified, every access logged, every value provable |
One architecture. Many manifestations.
Deploy Cachee in your authorization boundary. Smaller boundary. Faster ATO.
Every value FIPS-signed. Every access audited. Every result verifiable.